<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href="http://www.blogger.com/styles/atom.css" type="text/css"?><feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom' xmlns:openSearch='http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearchrss/1.0/'><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6100458435584048013.post7139517320416103298..comments</id><updated>2008-03-24T00:03:05.775-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Comments on Governance Risk and Compliance Solutions: Enterprise Risk Management Framework</title><link rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#feed' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://grcsolution.blogspot.com/feeds/7139517320416103298/comments/default'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6100458435584048013/7139517320416103298/comments/default'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://grcsolution.blogspot.com/2008/03/enterprise-risk-management-framework.html'/><author><name>Syed Salman Chishti</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/02117252451540569231</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author><generator version='7.00' uri='http://www.blogger.com'>Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>2</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>25</openSearch:itemsPerPage><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6100458435584048013.post-4659683483915415363</id><published>2008-03-24T00:03:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-03-24T00:03:00.000-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Millions thnx Mr Salman.My concept for GRC solutio...</title><content type='html'>Millions thnx Mr Salman.&lt;BR/&gt;My concept for GRC solutions and ERM is pretty much clear Now.&lt;BR/&gt;I browsed the net but i rank your theory for GRC and ERM at the Top.&lt;BR/&gt;Keep it up...</content><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6100458435584048013/7139517320416103298/comments/default/4659683483915415363'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6100458435584048013/7139517320416103298/comments/default/4659683483915415363'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://grcsolution.blogspot.com/2008/03/enterprise-risk-management-framework.html?showComment=1206342180000#c4659683483915415363' title=''/><author><name>Adeel</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/09608767632956595007</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author><thr:in-reply-to xmlns:thr='http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0' href='http://grcsolution.blogspot.com/2008/03/enterprise-risk-management-framework.html' ref='tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6100458435584048013.post-7139517320416103298' source='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6100458435584048013/posts/default/7139517320416103298' type='text/html'/></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6100458435584048013.post-4593675949022216559</id><published>2008-03-19T00:49:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-03-19T00:49:00.000-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Actually the main advantage of using a GRC is Corp...</title><content type='html'>Actually the main advantage of using a GRC is Corporate Governance.&lt;BR/&gt;Corporate governance is the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions affecting the way a corporation is directed, administered or controlled. Corporate governance also includes the relationships among the many players involved (the stakeholders) and the goals for which the corporation is governed. The principal players are the shareholders, management and the board of directors. Other stakeholders include employees, suppliers, customers, banks and other lenders, regulators, the environment and the community at large.&lt;BR/&gt;Corporate governance is a multi-faceted subject. An important theme of corporate governance is to ensure the accountability of certain individuals in an organization through mechanisms that try to reduce or eliminate the principal-agent problem. A related but separate thread of discussions focus on the impact of a corporate governance system in economic efficiency, with a strong emphasis on shareholders welfare. There are yet other aspects to the corporate governance subject, such as the stakeholder view and the corporate governance models around the world.&lt;BR/&gt;Corporate governance models around the world&lt;BR/&gt;Although the US model of corporate governance is the most notorious, there is a considerable variation in corporate governance models around the world. The intricated shareholding structures of keiretsus in Japan, the heavy presence of banks in the equity of German firms, the chaebols in South Korea and many others are examples of arrangements which try to respond to the same corporate governance challenges as in the US.&lt;BR/&gt;Anglo-American Model&lt;BR/&gt;There are many different models of corporate governance around the world. These differ according to the variety of capitalism in which they are embedded. The liberal model that is common in Anglo-American countries tends to give priority to the interests of shareholders. The coordinated model that one finds in Continental Europe and Japan also recognizes the interests of workers, managers, suppliers, customers, and the community. Both models have distinct competitive advantages, but in different ways. The liberal model of corporate governance encourages radical innovation and cost competition, whereas the coordinated model of corporate governance facilitates incremental innovation and quality competition. However, there are important differences between the U.S. recent approach to governance issues and what has happened in the U.K..&lt;BR/&gt;In the United States, a corporation is governed by a board of directors, which has the power to choose an executive officer, usually known as the chief executive officer. The CEO has broad power to manage the corporation on a daily basis, but needs to get board approval for certain major actions, such as hiring his/her immediate subordinates, raising money, acquiring another company, major capital expansions, or other expensive projects. Other duties of the board may include policy setting, decision making, monitoring management's performance, or corporate control.&lt;BR/&gt;The board of directors is nominally selected by and responsible to the shareholders, but the bylaws of many companies make it difficult for all but the largest shareholders to have any influence over the makeup of the board; normally, individual shareholders are not offered a choice of board nominees among which to choose, but are merely asked to rubberstamp the nominees of the sitting board. Perverse incentives have pervaded many corporate boards in the developed world, with board members beholden to the chief executive whose actions they are intended to oversee. Frequently, members of the boards of directors are CEOs of other corporations, which some see as a conflict of interest.&lt;BR/&gt;The U.K. has pioneered a flexible model of regulation of corporate governance, known as the "comply or explain" code of governance. This is a principle based code that lists a dozen of recommended practices, such as the separation of CEO and Chairman of the Board, the introduction of a time limit for CEOs' contracts, the introduction of a minimum number of non-executives Directors, of independent directors, the designation of a senior non executive director, the formation and composition of remuneration, audit and nomination committees. Publicly listed companies in the U.K. have to either apply those principles or, if they choose not to, to explain in a designated part of their annual reports why they decided not to do so. The monitoring of those explanations is left to shareholders themselves. The tenet of the Code is that one size does not fit all in matters of corporate governance and that instead of a statuary regime like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S., it is best to leave some flexibility to companies so that they can make choices most adapted to their circumstances. If they have good reasons to deviate from the sound rule, they should be able to convincingly explain those to their shareholders.&lt;BR/&gt;The code has been in place since 1993 and has had drastic effects on the way firms are governed in the U.K. A study by Arcot, Bruno and Faure-Grimaud from the Financial Markets Group at the London School of Economics shows that in 1993, about 10% of the UK companies member of the FTSE 350 were complaints on all dimensions while they were more than 60% in 2003. The same success was not achieved when looking at the explanation part for non compliant companies. Many deviations are simply not explained and a large majority of explanations fail to identify specific circumstances justifying those deviations. Still, the overall view is that the U.K.'s system works fairly well and in fact is often branded as a benchmark, followed by several countries.&lt;BR/&gt;Non Anglo-American Model&lt;BR/&gt;In East Asian countries, family-owned companies dominate. A study by Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) investigated the top 15 families in East Asian countries and found that they dominated listed corporate assets. In countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia and the Philippines, the top 15 families controlled over 50% of publicly owned corporations through a system of family cross-holdings, thus dominating the capital markets. Family-owned companies also dominate the Latin model of corporate governance, that is companies in Mexico, Italy, Spain, France (to a certain extent), Brazil, Argentina, and other countries in South America.&lt;BR/&gt;Europe and Asia exemplify the insider system: Shareholder and stakeholder&lt;BR/&gt;• a small number of listed companies,&lt;BR/&gt;• an illiquid capital market where ownership and control are not frequently traded&lt;BR/&gt;• high concentration of shareholding in the hands of corporations, institutions, families or government&lt;BR/&gt;. • the insider model uses a system of interlocking networks and committees.&lt;BR/&gt;At the same time that developing countries are undergoing a process of economic growth and transformation, they are also experiencing a revolution in the business and political relationships that characterize their private and public sectors. Establishing good corporate governance practices is essential to sustaining long-term development and growth as these countries move from closed, market-unfriendly, undemocratic systems towards open, market-friendly, democratic systems. Good corporate governance systems will allow organizations to realize their maximum productivity and efficiency, minimize corruption and abuse of power, and provide a system of managerial accountability.[8] These goals are equally important for both private corporations and government bodies.&lt;BR/&gt;Because of the implicit relationship between private interests and the larger government, good corporate governance practices are essential to establishing good governance at the national level in developing countries.A number of ties the keep the public and private sectors closely linked. On one hand, judiciary and regulatory bodies as well as legislatures play a role in corporate management and oversight. At the same time cartels and large corporate interests use their size to exert not only economic, but also political power. These two sectors are so intertwined that a country cannot significantly change one without simultaneously instituting changes in the other. &lt;BR/&gt;According to Nicolas Meisel, there are four priorities which developing countries should concentrate on while experimenting with new forms of corporate and public governance. The first is to focus on improving the quality of information and increasing the speed at which it is created and distributed to the public. Good communication is important to the functioning of any organization. The second is to allow individual actors more autonomy while at the same time maintaining or increasing accountability. Thirdly, if a hierarchical organization used to orient private activities toward the general interest, new countervailing powers should be encouraged to fill this role. Finally, the part the state plays and how government officials are selected must be considered if a developing economy is to achieve sustainable growth. This may involve making it easier for newcomers with new ideas incumbents who may hold to older, possibly outdated, models</content><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6100458435584048013/7139517320416103298/comments/default/4593675949022216559'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6100458435584048013/7139517320416103298/comments/default/4593675949022216559'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://grcsolution.blogspot.com/2008/03/enterprise-risk-management-framework.html?showComment=1205912940000#c4593675949022216559' title=''/><author><name>muhammad salman</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/06183727799404124100</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author><thr:in-reply-to xmlns:thr='http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0' href='http://grcsolution.blogspot.com/2008/03/enterprise-risk-management-framework.html' ref='tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6100458435584048013.post-7139517320416103298' source='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6100458435584048013/posts/default/7139517320416103298' type='text/html'/></entry></feed>